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86 
REDEMPTION SONG: GRAHAM V. FLORIDA 
AND THE EVOLVING EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Robert Smith* and G. Ben Cohen**† 
Introduction 
In Graham v. Florida,1 the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits a sentence of life without parole (“LWOP”) for a juvenile 
under eighteen who commits a non-homicide offense. For Terrance Graham, 
who committed home-invasion robbery at seventeen, the decision does not 
mean necessarily that he someday will leave the brick walls of Florida’s 
Taylor Annex Correctional Institution. Unlike previous Eighth Amendment 
decisions, such as Roper v. Simmons,2 where the Court barred the death pe-
nalty for juveniles, this new categorical rule does not translate into 
automatic relief for members of the exempted class: “A State need not guar-
antee the offender eventual release,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, 
“but if it imposes a sentence of life it must provide him or her with some 
realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.” Graham 
offers the possibility of redemption but not its guarantee.  
Pragmatists are understandably skeptical.3 Yet beyond the narrow appli-
cation of this rule to the small class of child-offenders, Graham contains the 
ingredients to be of transformative significance to the Supreme Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the opinion—employing a method 
of comparative analysis typically reserved for its capital cases—cements a 
proportionality requirement in the Court’s non-capital Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Second, the Court uses for the first time a method of constitu-
tional elucidation that draws two separate and seemingly parallel lines of 
jurisprudence together to articulate an independent constitutional principle. 
Third, the Court articulates the “possibility of redemption” as an essential 
                                                                                                                      
 * Counsel for the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law 
School. 
 ** Of Counsel for the Capital Appeals Project in New Orleans, Louisiana. 
 † Suggested citation: Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Commentary, Redemption Song: 
Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 Mich. L. Rev. First 
Impressions 86 (2010), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/smithcohen.pdf. 
 1. 78 U.S.L.W. 4387 (2010). 
 2. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 3. States that have enacted prohibitions on parole for child offenders could simply convert 
statutory prohibitions into de jure limitations, by allowing parole under the law, but denying it inde-
finitely. An opportunity for parole that might be realistic in Washington D.C. could be completely 
unattainable before parole boards in Florida, California and Louisiana. 
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consideration arising from evolving standards of decency. These three com-
ponents—proportionality, constitutional triangulation, and the notion that 
people and their propensities are not static—suggest that Graham could 
have far greater significance in the life of the law than in the life of child 
defendants toiling, for instance, in the fields of the Florida Penitentiary.4  
I. The Eighth Amendment’s Proportionality Principle 
The Graham opinion’s most significant doctrinal conclusion is that the 
Eighth Amendment proportionality provision applies to non-homicide of-
fenses and allows for categorical exclusions of certain offenders (here, 
juveniles) for certain types of offenses (here, non-homicides) from certain 
punishments (life without parole). Whether the Court’s “death is different” 
jurisprudence limited this broad conception of proportionality to capital of-
fenses had plagued the Court for nearly three decades.  
A. Non-Capital Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
In Weems v. United States,5 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
could not condone a fifteen-year sentence at hard labor in chains and with 
permanent civil disabilities for the crime of falsifying a public document. 
Reversing Mr. Weems’s sentence, the Court underscored the notion that 
“punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to the of-
fense.” The Court echoed the importance of the proportionality mechanism 
fifty years later in California v. Robinson.6 The Robinson Court reversed as 
excessive a 90 day prison sentence for “addiction to the use of narcotics.” 
Ninety days’ incarceration is not inherently excessive punishment, the Court 
noted, but the proper question is whether the particular sentence is exces-
sive considering the particular crime: “Even one day in prison would be a 
cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.” 
Following Robinson, the nine justices traded blows for the next three 
decades over the existence and scope of a proportionality principle in non-
capital Eighth Amendment cases. However, before describing those cases, 
we briefly highlight the death-is-different jurisprudence that serves as a 
counterpoint to the non-capital jurisprudence developed after Robinson. In 
his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia,7 where the Court struck down 
the three capital sentencing statutes at issue and effectively halted the ad-
ministration of capital punishment in America, Justice Stewart articulated 
what has come to be known as the “death is different” approach: 
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment 
not in degree, but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique 
                                                                                                                      
 4. Graham is one of 72 juveniles sentenced to LWOP in Florida. 
 5. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
 6. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
 7. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of crimi-
nal justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that 
is embodied in our concept of humanity. 
The Court applied the death-is-different approach in Coker v. Georgia,8 
prohibiting the death penalty as a possible punishment for the rape of an 
adult woman. More recently, the Court has used the same analysis to bar 
capital punishment for homicides committed by juveniles9 and the mentally 
retarded,10 and for all non-homicide offenses.11 
Non-capital defendants have struggled greatly against the weight of the 
death-is-different philosophy. In Rummel v. Estelle,12 then-Justice Rehnquist 
wrote for the Court that sentences less than death were functionally unsus-
ceptible to Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis: “Outside the 
context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality 
of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare.” The Court emphasized 
that it could “draw a ‘bright line’ between the punishment of death and the 
various other permutations and commutations of punishments short of that 
ultimate sanction. . . . [T]his line was considerably clearer than would be 
any constitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or 
longer term of years.” The pendulum swung the other way in Solem v. 
Helm,13 where the Court reversed as excessive a life sentence without parole 
for a minor nonviolent felony committed by a recidivist offender. Emphasiz-
ing the “principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime” as 
one “deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence,” 
the Court reaffirmed that proportionality applied to non-homicide offenses. 
Distinguishing Solem from Rummel on the grounds that Solem enjoyed the 
possibility of parole, the Court refused to reverse Rummel outright.  
The Court reversed gears again in Harmelin v. Michigan,14 holding that 
the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit a life without parole sentence for a 
first-time offender convicted of possessing a large quantity of cocaine. Not-
ing that “[p]roportionality review is one of several respects in which we 
have held that ‘death is different,’ and have imposed protections that the 
Constitution nowhere else provides,” the Court expressly cabined the con-
cept of excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment to its capital 
jurisprudence. However, in a separate concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy 
observed that the Eighth Amendment does contain a “narrow proportionality 
principle,” that “does not require strict proportionality between crime and 
sentence” but rather “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly 
                                                                                                                      
 8. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 9. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 10. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 11. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008). 
 12. 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
 13. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 14. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
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disproportionate’ to the crime.” He then concluded that “[t]he Eighth 
Amendment proportionality principle also applies to noncapital sentences.” 
In Ewing v. California,15 the Court explicitly validated Justice Kennedy’s 
Harmelin concurrence, finding that the Eighth Amendment “contains a nar-
row proportionality principle that applies to noncapital sentences.” 
Nonetheless, Justice O’Connor’s opinion gave the impression that the sub-
stance of Harmelin and Rummel still held sway. For example, O’Connor 
reiterated the line from Rummel that successful challenges in the non-capital 
context are (and should be) exceedingly rare. Moreover, the Court rejected 
Ewing’s contention that his recidivist sentence of 25-years-to-life for steal-
ing three golf clubs constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Concurring 
in the judgment, Justice Scalia wrote that in addition to his belief that the 
Eighth Amendment simply barred particular modes of punishment, he could 
not follow the Court’s proportionality analysis even out of respect for 
precedent, because he did not believe that it could be intelligently applied. 
The ray of light left shining by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion ap-
peared to have been extinguished. 
But the approach articulated by Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in 
Harmelin appears to have won the day in Graham. Borrowing from the 
Court’s capital jurisprudence, Justice Kennedy wrote, “[T]he standard of 
extreme cruelty is not merely descriptive, but necessarily embodies a moral 
judgment. The standard itself remains the same, but its applicability must 
change as the basic mores of society change.” He then returned to the basic 
premise that punishment must not be disproportionate to the crime, empha-
sizing that the “concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth 
Amendment.” Intertwining citations from the Court’s capital and non-capital 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Graham opinion drops the death-is-
different motif but nonetheless conducts the same type of proportionality 
review contained in capital cases like Simmons, Atkins, and Kennedy. 
The best indicator of the Eighth Amendment’s tide shift away from cas-
es like Rummel and Ewing is expressed in the dissent by Justices Thomas 
and Scalia,16 which decries the Court’s “departure from the ‘death is differ-
ent’ distinction” and laments that the break is “especially mystifying when 
one considers how long it has resisted crossing that divide.” Justice Stevens’ 
answer to Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, ac-
cepts and welcomes that change in the law: 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas argues that today’s holding is not 
entirely consistent with the controlling opinions in Lockyer v. Andrade, 
Ewing v. California, Harmelin v. Michigan, and Rummel v. Estelle. Given 
that “evolving standards of decency” have played a central role in our 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for at least a century, see Weems v. Unit-
ed States, this argument suggests the dissenting opinions in those cases 
more accurately describe the law today than does Justice Thomas’ rigid in-
                                                                                                                      
 15. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).  
 16. Justice Alito joined Parts I and III of Justice Thomas’s dissent, but not the relevant por-
tion in Part II. 
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terpretation of the Amendment. Society changes. Knowledge accumulates. 
We learn, sometimes, from our mistakes. Punishments that did not seem 
cruel and unusual at one time may, in the light of reason and experience, 
be found cruel and unusual at a later time; unless we are to abandon the 
moral commitment embodied in the Eighth Amendment, proportionality 
review must never become effectively obsolete. 
All nine justices appear to have agreed on one thing in Graham: the 
Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle has risen again in non-capital 
cases and it appears poised to stay. 
B. Are Categorical Challenges the New Different? 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion attempts to bridge some of the perceived dis-
tance between the previous non-capital Eighth Amendment decisions and 
Graham by distinguishing between categorical challenges to a sentencing 
practice and challenges to an individual sentence. The distinction is more 
semantic than substantive. For example, Justice Kennedy suggests that the 
type of analysis conducted in Harmelin and Ewing is appropriate in assess-
ing a “gross proportionality challenge” instead of a categorical challenge. 
Kennedy describes the principles that guide this type of analysis:  
A court must begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severi-
ty of the sentence. In the rare case in which this threshold comparison 
leads to an inference of gross disproportionality the court should then 
compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by other of-
fenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the 
same crime in other jurisdictions. If this comparative analysis validates an 
initial judgment that the sentence is grossly disproportionate, the sentence 
is cruel and unusual. 
By contrast, so-called categorical challenges to non-capital sentences, 
Kennedy suggests, should borrow from the approach taken in the Court’s 
capital cases: 
The Court first considers “objective indicia of society’s standards, as ex-
pressed in legislative enactments and state practice” to determine whether 
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Next, 
guided by “the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the 
Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
text, history, meaning, and purpose,” the Court must determine in the exer-
cise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment in question 
violates the Constitution. 
The shortcomings of this distinction are apparent. The defendants in Ew-
ing and Harmelin challenged the constitutionality of a type of punishment 
(life imprisonment), for a class of offenses (drug and recidivist offenses), 
committed by any offender. In Graham, the challenge involved the constitu-
tionality of a type of punishment (life imprisonment), for a class of offenses 
(non-homicide felonies), committed by a particular class of offender (ado-
lescent offenders). If Ewing had prevailed, a state would be hard pressed to 
SMITH & COHEN FINAL 6/27/2010 9:01 AM 
2010] Graham v. Florida 91 
 
distinguish a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a nonviolent triggering 
offense where the prior offenses were also nonviolent. On the other hand, if 
the Court had struck down Graham’s sentence without explicitly delineating 
the categorical rule, the vast majority of juvenile LWOP sentences would be 
void. To label such a result an “individual challenge” because the petitioner 
did not label a specific subcategory for whom this rule should be applicable 
is conceptually challenging. The practical difference is marginal, and the 
mere fact that Graham was successful and Ewing not, does not warrant the 
conclusion that two different modes of analysis are necessary. Furthermore, 
the fact that the Court repeatedly refused to require state courts to conduct 
proportionality review in capital cases (or to do such review in the first in-
stance),17 but would conduct review of individual challenges to the 
proportionality of an individual offender’s non-capital sentencing, does not 
accord with the unique seriousness of capital punishment. 
II. The Transformation of Constitutional Exegesis 
More significant than the core Eighth Amendment holding adopted in 
Graham, is the textured manner in which Justice Kennedy brought the Court 
to the opinion. The opinion brings two separate constitutional holdings to-
gether to create a third. The opinion identifies the first constitutional 
principle, “With respect to the nature of the offense, the Court has con-
cluded that capital punishment is impermissible for nonhomicide crimes 
against individuals.” The second constitutional principle the Court identified 
concerned adolescent development and culpability: “Roper established that 
because juveniles have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the 
most severe punishments.” The Court converged these two separate prin-
ciples to articulate a third: “It follows that, when compared to an adult 
murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice 
diminished moral culpability.” 
The articulation of this method of constitutional mathematics (Kennedy 
v. Louisiana + Roper v. Simmons = Graham v. Florida) is not limited solely 
to this instance. For example, it would appear that a claim exists that a sen-
tence of LWOP would also be unconstitutional for a mentally retarded 
defendant who did not kill or participate in a homicide; similarly a juvenile 
offender involved in a felony that resulted in death and who was not death 
eligible under Enmund v. Florida18 would also have a constitutional claim to 
the possibility of parole. 
But even more meaningful than the operation of this constitutional ma-
thematics to this narrow line of cases is its potential operation within the 
wider death penalty framework. As the Court observed in Kennedy, its prior 
death penalty jurisprudence has been marked by the “tension between gen-
eral rules and case-specific circumstances” that has “produced results not all 
                                                                                                                      
 17. Walker v. Georgia, 129 S. Ct. 453 (2008) (statement of Stevens, J.); Pulley v. Harris, 465 
U.S. 37 (1983). 
 18. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
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together satisfactory.” Indeed this combination of constitutional principles 
may have been what the Court found lacking when it acknowledged that the 
Eighth Amendment “case law [] is still in search of a unifying principle.” In 
Graham, the Court acknowledged that “restraint,” “decency,” and moral 
consistency operate to conjoin constitutional principles rather than separate 
them into individual strains, each unknowable but by five (or more) of the 
Court’s justices. 
III. The Constitutionally Significant Possibility of Redemption 
Graham’s most significant role may be in its recognition of redemption 
as an Eighth Amendment constitutional principle, rejecting a legislative de-
termination that entire classes of individuals were irredeemable: 
Those who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles may turn out to be 
irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their 
lives. The Eighth Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that per-
sons convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will 
remain behind bars for life. It does forbid States from making the judg-
ment at the outset that those offenders never will be fit to reenter society. 
Before Graham, redemption was hardly mentioned as a constitutional 
principle. Only two cases even reference it in a constitutional context.19 Re-
habilitation, on the other hand, has always been an essential component of 
the calculus in assessing the proper goals of punishment. But rehabilitation 
and redemption are separate concerns. The possibility of rehabilitation pro-
vides a response to, or mediates, the goal of incapacitation. However, the 
possibility of rehabilitation fails to rebut the concept of retribution. Hence 
Gregg’s finding that the death penalty was justified. Rehabilitation provides 
no moral salve that defeats the need for retribution—all rehabilitation does 
is provide an efficiency basis for defeating a death (or LWOP) sentence. 
Redemption, or the possibility of it, however, offers a moral response to the 
need for retribution. It responds to the call for infliction of suffering, to capi-
tal punishment’s “expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly 
offensive conduct.” 
The Court in Graham held that the Eighth Amendment “forbid[s] States 
from making the judgment at the outset that [juvenile] offenders never will 
be fit to reenter society.” Such a judgment, the Court explained, is tanta-
mount to a determination that the juvenile is not redeemable. While some 
juvenile offenders might be forever dangerous to society, the “subjective 
                                                                                                                      
 19. Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7, 44 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In response to the 
majority’s suggestion that this case may be inconsistent with Johnson v. Texas . . . I note only that 
Johnson addressed a very different question, namely, whether a jury considering future dangerous-
ness could give adequate weight to a capital defendant's youth. Whatever connection may exist 
between a defendant’s youth and his future dangerousness, there is no connection whatsoever be-
tween respondent’s evidence that he was capable of redemption and a ‘circumstance which 
extenuates the gravity of the crime’ . . . .”); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 668-69 (1992) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“However uplifting this tale of personal redemption, our task is to illumi-
nate the protections of the Speedy Trial Clause, not to take the measure of one man’s life”). 
SMITH & COHEN FINAL 6/27/2010 9:01 AM 
2010] Graham v. Florida 93 
 
judgment[s] by a judge or jury that the offender is irredeemably depraved, 
are insufficient to prevent the possibility that the offender will receive a life 
without parole sentence for which he or she lacks the moral culpability.” 
Rather, juvenile offenders must be given the opportunity to “to achieve ma-
turity of judgment and self-recognition of human worth and potential.” In 
other words, States must give juvenile offenders at least a shot at redemp-
tion.  
We have come a long way. For most of our history we have treated of-
fenders in a one-size-fits-all fashion that views the individual as a one-
dimensional, interest-maximizing, deliberate being that carefully calculates 
the risks and harms associated with his transgressions. The Eighth Amend-
ment question focused on the offense and the punishment, largely ignoring 
the characteristics of the offender. The Court has affirmed sentences as pro-
portionate to the crime by referring to the individual offender as “one who is 
simply unable to bring his conduct within the social norms prescribed by the 
criminal law of the State.”20 The offender’s circumstances—social, cogni-
tive, physiological—mattered little.  
In the capital context, the Court has found that the “respect for human 
dignity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of aspects 
of the character of the individual offender,” and that a capital statute cannot 
“treat[] all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely indi-
vidual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass 
. . . .”21 In Atkins, the Court looked to the culpability of mentally retarded 
defendants in general, and concluded that they possess “diminished capaci-
ties to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstract 
from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.” Furthermore, 
“there is abundant evidence that they often act on impulse rather than pur-
suant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers 
rather than leaders.” 
Similarly, in Simmons, the Court determined that juvenile offenders as a 
class are less likely to “engage[] in the kind of cost-benefit analysis that at-
taches any weight to the possibility of execution,” more likely to possess 
“[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . qual-
ities [that] often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions,” and are “more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences 
and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” Further, the Court ex-
plained, “personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.” 
The Graham opinion began with a detailed description of its namesake, 
Terrance Jamar Graham: His “parents were addicted to crack cocaine, and 
their drug use persisted in his early years. Graham was diagnosed with at-
tention deficit hyperactivity disorder in elementary school. He began 
drinking alcohol and using tobacco at age 9 and smoked marijuana at age 
13.” Including this description in at the fore of the case extends the character 
                                                                                                                      
 20. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284 (1980).  
 21. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
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of the offender focus beyond capital jurisprudence and infuses the Eighth 
Amendment with a sense that external forces help to shape the life choices 
of the offender, and, conversely, help to explain why a person is not intrinsi-
cally incapable of redemption. 
But the most significant aspect of the Court’s decision is the recognition 
that a once-and-for-all determination of an offender’s capacity to change 
cannot be made at the onset of the sentence. Once we leave the limited ex-
ample of the juvenile who is not fully developed, we find the same lack of 
perspective, foresight and impulse control in the drug and alcohol addicted 
offender and the offender with a severe mental illness, among others. And as 
an offender who committed a crime while under the grips of insufficiently 
treated schizophrenia or the chemical dependency of a heroin addiction is 
treated or becomes sober, and as their lives change and grow around them, 
Graham should be read more broadly as allowing for the possibility of hope 
despite cruel sentencing practices that leave little room for it to shine. 
Conclusion 
The Graham Court explicitly embraced the possibility that people can 
change, and in doing so, the justifications for continued incarceration wea-
ken. Recognizing that juveniles are both categorically less culpable than 
adult offenders due to their underdeveloped maturity and decision-making 
capacity, and that at least some of these children can be redeemed over time, 
the Court prohibits states from rejecting the possibility of release at the on-
set of the conviction in nonhomicide cases involving juvenile offenders. 
This awareness that people are not static, and that they have within them the 
opportunity for moral development, opens the door to the possibility of re-
demption as a counter-consideration to the penological goal of retribution. 
And this realization suggests that the Court’s notion of capital punishment 
as an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct 
may ultimately be tempered with its recognition of the possibility for re-
demption. 
